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Are Women Winning? Does Descriptive Representation of Women in Parliament
Lead to Woman-Friendly Policy in Sub-Saharan Africa?
Abstract
Under what conditions will women’s presence in elective office promote woman-friendly policies? The
research outlined here will examine this question through a comparison of six Sub-Saharan African
democracies (Benin, Botswana, Lesotho, Senegal, South Africa and Tanzania). Women have been elected
into sub-Saharan African parliaments in record numbers, but is this leading to increased substantive
representation, or the enactment of policies that focus on benefitting women? Following a Most Similar
Systems design, this research develops an original composite scale to measure woman-friendly policy
and finds that there is no clear relationship between descriptive and substantive representation. The
remainder of the analysis seeks to identify the factors that lead to the breakdown between women’s
presence and womanfriendly policy. While no relationship between descriptive and substantive
representation exists, different institutional and cultural perspectives influence woman-friendly policy in
this region.
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Are Women Winning? Does Descriptive Representation of Women in Parliament
Lead to Woman-Friendly Policy in Sub-Saharan Africa?
Molly Willeford
Abstract: Under what conditions will women’s presence in elective office promote
woman-friendly policies? The research outlined here will examine this question through
a comparison of six Sub-Saharan African democracies (Benin, Botswana, Lesotho,
Senegal, South Africa and Tanzania). Women have been elected into sub-Saharan
African parliaments in record numbers, but is this leading to increased substantive
representation, or the enactment of policies that focus on benefitting women? Following
a Most Similar Systems design, this research develops an original composite scale to
measure woman-friendly policy and finds that there is no clear relationship between
descriptive and substantive representation. The remainder of the analysis seeks to
identify the factors that lead to the breakdown between women’s presence and womanfriendly policy. While no relationship between descriptive and substantive representation
exists, different institutional and cultural perspectives influence woman-friendly policy in
this region.
INTRODUCTION
In recent years, women have been elected as Members of Parliament (MPs) in
dramatically increasing numbers. Of the top ten nations in the world for gender parity in
parliaments, four are Sub-Saharan African nations (IPU 2015). In fact, in 2008, Rwanda
became the first country in the world to have more women than men in its lower chamber
of parliament (Barnes and Burchard 2013). Yet, in that same country, 56% of women
reported experiencing some kind of gender-based violence in 2014 (SIGI 2014). The
region remains one of the worst in the world for gender-based violence: 40% of women
living in Sub-Saharan Africa report that they have been victims of gender-based violence,
and 54% believe that domestic abuse is an acceptable practice (SIGI 2014). The Social
Institutions and Gender Index 2014 report states that “seven countries have no laws on
rape, 17 have no laws on domestic violence, and 11 have no laws on sexual harassment”
(SIGI 2014). As of last year, the region also reported high levels of discrimination
regarding socio-economic rights; 18% of women living in the region do not have access
to land titles, and discrimination in inheritance titles persists in 12 countries, making it
difficult for women to have control over land and assets (SIGI 2014).
This raises several inter-related questions: under what conditions does women’s
presence in elected office lead to woman-friendly policy? Specifically, do women elected
to national parliaments in Sub-Saharan Africa work to pass legislation surrounding
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violence against women? One of the main arguments regarding increased descriptive
representation (presence in elected office) is that it will lead to substantive policies that
benefit and are of concern to women (Bauer 2012; Stockemer 2011; Conner 2009; Krook
2009; Bauer 2008; Bauer & Britton 2006). Do sub-Saharan African countries with higher
levels of female legislative representation have less discriminatory policies than subSaharan African countries with lower levels of female descriptive representation? If not,
then what may help to explain why presence does not result in concrete policy or status
improvements for women?
LITERATURE REVIEW
There is much debate on the link between women’s descriptive representation and
substantive representation. Many believe that women involved in parliaments will bring
increased attention to women’s interests and, therefore will bring about more womanfriendly policies (Barnes & Burchard 2013; Stockemer 2011; Tripp & Kang 2008).
However, much of the literature suggests that no clear link exists between increased
numbers in parliaments and woman-friendly policy being passed in the legislatures
(Bauer & Burnet 2013; Conner 2008; Waylen 2008; Bauer 2008). If electing more
women to parliament does not produce positive policy outcomes in areas like domestic
abuse and rape, then what explains that discrepancy? The literature suggests that other
kinds of institutional and cultural factors may promote or inhibit woman-friendly policy
making.
Arguably, democracies are the better type of government for achieving
substantive representation. Women are more likely to have their positions heard in a
democracy as opposed to an authoritarian regime (Bauer 2012; Stockemer 2011; Tripp &
Kang 2008; Yoon 2004). Legislators in authoritarian regimes may not have much policymaking power, due to power being vested elsewhere, in the executive (Stockemer 2011).
Newer democratic constitutions, on the contrary, often play a role in shaping progressive
policy regarding women, reflecting the “changing of times” (Bauer 2012).
Gender quotas have become a common solution for the problem of low
descriptive representation of women, but while a gender quota may increase women’s
presence in the halls of power, that does not necessarily lead to improved policy sway
(Bauer 2012; Bauer 2008; Conner 2008). This can often happen when a government
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adopts reserved seats or legislated party quotas (Adams 2011; Conner 2008; Tripp &
Kang 2008).
Research suggests that voluntary party quotas empower women and reduce
tokenism, the idea that only a symbolic effort is being made like recruiting more women
into political office. Often, the push for an adoption of gender quotas comes through
pressure from international organizations or governments to increase female
representation (Barnes & Burchard 2013; Waylen 2008). In 1995, a Conference on
Women in Beijing, hosted by the UN, made a call for gender parity in bodies of
government by the year 2015 (Krook 2009). This was made in hopes of not only
including more women in political decision-making bodies, but to hopefully see more
woman-friendly policy being passed in countries where women are marginalized, like
sub-Saharan Africa (Amoateng, et al 2014).
Adoption of voluntary quotas, however, probably relies on some level of cultural
support for gender equality. One of the most influential cultural factors is religion (Norris
& Inglehart 2001). Studies have found that Catholic countries adhere to more hierarchal
and authoritarian cultural values (Norris & Inglehart 2001). However, even more studies
have shown that Catholicism does not matter – if a country is Catholic or Protestant, or
even predominantly Christian, they will have more women friendly policies and practices
than states with other religious practices (Norris & Inglehart 2001). Countries that tend
to practice indigenous religions will have a harder time accepting pro-woman policies.
Catholic, Islamic, and indigenous religions doctrines take a more traditional view of
women’s roles in society, encouraging larger families, and restrict women’s bodily
autonomy, placing women in subordinate positions to men in society, economy, and
family. In such societies, which may often be agrarian, it is less likely to find societal
support (or demand) for woman-friendly policies, such as laws against rape or child
marriage laws. It will also be likely for traditional societies to adopt voluntary gender
quotas that promote women’s presence in policy-effective ways.
The literature reviewed here suggests the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1: Sub-Saharan African countries with higher numbers of
women in parliaments will pass more woman-friendly policies.
Hypothesis 2: Favoring institutional factors will contribute to more
woman-friendly policies in place.
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Hypothesis 2a: Voluntary political party quotas will lead to more womanfriendly policies.
Hypothesis 2b: Proportional representation voting systems will favor more
woman-friendly policies.
Hypothesis 3: Favoring cultural factors, like religions and birth rates, will
contribute to more woman-friendly policies.
Hypothesis 3a: Countries that are Christian will favor more womanfriendly policies.
Hypothesis 3b: Countries with lower fertility rates will favor more
woman-friendly policies.
RESEARCH DESIGN AND MEASUREMENT
The current research employs a small-N comparative cases design involving six
sub-Saharan African democracies that vary substantially in terms of the main hypothesis
variable: women’s descriptive representation. The cases are all considered free
democracies by the Freedom House 2015 report (scoring 1 to 3). See Table 1. Twelve
sub-Saharan African countries meet that criterion. From those, six were selected for their
variation on the main hypothesis variable, women’s share of the lower or only house in
the legislature. Female representation in the sample ranges from a low of 7.2% in Benin
to a high of 42.7% in Senegal. If Hypothesis 1 is valid, then Benin should have the least
woman-friendly policies and Senegal should have much stronger legal protections of
women’s bodily safety and autonomy.
Dependent Variable Measure
Woman-friendly policy, as defined in the literature review, can be an allencompassing term. The Social Institutions and Gender Index (SIGI 2014) database
created a score for 160 countries around the world, measuring policy relating to women’s
rights. The index measures the legality of discriminatory family codes; restricted physical
integrity; son bias; restricted resources and assets; and restricted civil liberties (SIGI
2014). For the purposes of this study, only the subcategories of discriminatory family
codes, restricted physical integrity, and restricted civil liberties will be examined.
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Table 1: Case Selection
Freedom

Percentage

House Score:

(from IPU):

Benin

2

7.2%

Botswana

2.5

9.5%

Lesotho

2.5

25%

Tanzania

3

36%

S. Africa

2

41.9%

Senegal

2

42.7%

Country:

Source: Inter-Parliamentary Union’s (IPU) “Women in National Parliaments” database from September 2015.

The database measures the legal framework from 0, meaning the law guarantees
this right, to 1, meaning there are no laws in place at this time for this right. So if a
country has a 0 for laws addressing domestic abuse, this country would have adequate
laws in place and would have no problems with the implementation of said law (SIGI
2014). However, if a country were to have a score of 1, then there would be no adequate
laws in place addressing domestic abuse in this country. While this score is an accurate
measure of laws in each country, the coding for this research has been flipped to produce
more intuitive findings. A score of 1 means that there are adequate laws in place and no
problems of implementation, and 0 means no laws are in place. A weight of 0.50 was
given to laws addressing domestic violence, rape, and sexual harassment, because those
issues are of obvious urgency for women. Table 2 shows how each of the composite
scores were assigned to each case, given the SIGI Index score of legislation in place to
address issues of legal ages of marriage, parental authority in divorce, domestic violence,
rape, sexual harassment, and access to public spaces. The numbers were added together
and weighted to produce the scores shown in Table 2. The values range from least
friendly (Tanzania, 4.25) to most friendly (South Africa, 7.5).
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Table 2: Dependent Variable Composition
Legal Age of
Marriage

Tanzania

Senegal

Botswana

Lesotho

Benin

S. Africa

0

0.25

0.5

0.5

1

1

0.5

0.5

0.5

1

1

1

0

0.5

0.5

0.5

0.5

1

1

1

1.25

0

1.25

1.25

1.25

1

1

1.25

1

1.25

1

1.25

1

1

1.25

1

0.5

0.5

0.5

1

0.5

1

4.5

5

5.25

5.25

6.5

7.5

Parental
Authority in
Divorce
Inheritance
Rights for
Daughters
Laws
Addressing
Domestic
Violence
Laws
Addressing
Rape
Laws
Addressing
Sexual
Harassment
Access to
Public Space
TOTALS

Source: Social Institution and Gender Index (SIGI) Data from 2014.

Independent Variables
Independent variable measures come from a range of standard data sources. Years
of independence were obtained from the Country Profiles from the CIA World Factbook.
Gender Gap Index scores were taken from the World Economic Forum’s Global Gender
Gap report from 2014. United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) presence was
taken from their About Africa page. Gender Inequality Index scores and Human
Development Index ranks were obtained through the Human Development reports issued
by the UNDP. Gross Domestic Product purchasing power parity (GDP PPP) per capita
was gathered through the World Bank’s GDP per capita PPP measure. Fragile States
Index rankings were gathered from the Fund For Peace’s Fragile States Index report from
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2015. The years that constitutions were enacted were found from the Country Profiles
from the CIA World Factbook. Voting systems information was acquired from the
Parline Database from the IPU. Information about different quotas was retrieved from the
Quota Project’s Global Database of Quotas for Women, part of the IPU’s research.
Majority religious beliefs were also taken from the CIA World Factbook. Fertility rates
were taken from the World Bank’s fertility rates totals.
ANALYSIS
Hypothesis 1 posits that there will be a positive relationship between descriptive
and substantive representation of women. Table 3 shows the final composite scores for
each of the cases in comparison to their percentages of women in parliament. South
Africa scores the highest on the dependent variable scale, with the second highest
percentage of women of the countries examined. Tanzania, however, scores the lowest,
even with the third highest percentage of women in parliament. Indeed, there appears to
be no clear covariation between the main hypotheses variable and the dependent variable.
The overall hypothesis that higher descriptive representation will lead to more
substantive representation is not upheld based on the results in Table 3. What, then, can
explain the variation in woman-friendly policy in the sample?
Table 3: Descriptive Representation and Substantive Representation
Country:

Tanzania

Senegal

Botswana

Lesotho

Benin

S. Africa

Percent:

36%

42.7%

9.5%

25%

7.2%

41.9%

(medium)

(high)

(low)

(medium)

(low)

(high)

4.5

5

5.25

5.25

6.5

7.5

Composite
Score:

In a Most Similar Systems Design, cases are compared by controlling variables to
account for the variance with the dependent variable, woman-friendly policy. By
controlling for these similar variables, the potential independent variable, or variables,
causing the variance will emerge. Why is Benin outscoring four other countries? Why is
Tanzania with women constituting 36% of its legislature so unfriendly to women in the
policy arena? Table 4 allows us to eliminate several possible answers and hone in on the
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factors that can explain the disconnect between women’s legislative presence and
woman-friendly policy on the most basic women’s issue: bodily autonomy.
In broad terms, all of the countries in the sample are post-colonial, with a UNDP
presence, and substantial gender gaps. Those similarities cannot explain the wide
dispersion on the dependent variable. With the exception of South Africa and Botswana,
all of the cases have low HDI rankings, low GDP per capita, high state fragility, and
sharp gender inequality. In South Africa, relative strength in those areas seems to
correlate with better outcomes as one would expect; but that is not the case in Botswana.
This leaves a set of institutional and cultural variables summarized in Table 5.
Which of these variables can account for the variance in woman-friendly policy
across six cases? To begin, the year of the latest constitutional amendment seems to
correspond to the score for policy received. At the Beijing Conference, mentioned earlier,
countries around the globe were called upon to increase the numbers of women in the
parliaments. As past literature suggests, one of the fastest ways to increase women in
parliaments is through the adoption of quotas (Krook 2009; Tripp & Kang 2008). After
the call for more women was made by the UN, most constitutions after 1995 include
some provision for the inclusion of more women. With the exception of Senegal, those
cases with their latest constitutions amended or adjusted in the 1990s typically scored
higher on the woman-friendly policy scale. Tanzania has the second oldest constitution
and it has the lowest score for woman-friendly policy. Senegal, on the other hand, is the
exception: with a constitution last amended in 2001, it reports high numbers of women in
parliament, potentially as a direct result from the 1995 UN Conference, and yet it scored
low on the policy composite scale.
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Table 4: Sub-Saharan African Cases
Tanzania

Senegal

Botswana

Lesotho

Benin

S. Africa

1964

1960

1966

1966

1960

1961

Gender Gap Index

0.718

0.691

0.713

0.725

---

0.753

UNDP Presence

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Gender Inequality

0.533

0.537

0.486

0.557

0.614

0.461

HDI Rank

Low

Low

Medium

Low

Low

Medium

GDP (PPP) per

$1,656

$2,174

$14,454

$2,390

$1,643

$12,042

Fragile States

High

High

Low

Warning

Warning

Low Warning

Index

Warning

Warning

Warning

Latest Constitution

1977

2001

1966

1993

1990

1997

Voting System

Majority

Mixed

Majority

Mixed

Proportional

Proportional

Quotas

Reserved

LCQ

VPPQ

LCQ

none

VPPQ

Muslim

Christian

Christian

Catholic

Christian

Year of
Independence

Index

capita

Seats
Majority Religious

Muslim &

Beliefs

Indigenous
beliefs

Percent Economy

Ag - 31.5%

Ag - 15.8%

Ag - 2.4%

Ag - 5.4%

Ag - 23.5%

Ag - 2.5%

by sector

Ind - 25%

Ind - 23.5%

Ind - 39.2%

Ind - 31.9%

Ind - 23.2%

Ind - 29.5%

S - 43.5%

S - 60.7%

S - 58.4%

S - 68.1%

S - 53.4%

S - 68%

Fertility Rates

5.2

4.9

2.6

3.0

4.8

2.4

IPU Percent

36%

42.7%

935%

25%

7.2%

41.9%

Composite Score

4.25

5

5.25

5.25

6.5

7.5
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Importantly, Tanzania and South Africa, the low and high poles on womanfriendly policy, appear to be polar opposites for every institutional and cultural variable.
Institutionally, quotas voting systems, the literature suggests that the most effective way
to including more women in parliaments is through proportional representation (PR) list
electoral system: this system allows more women to enter parliament and gain positions
of influence (Adams 2011; Yoon 2004). South Africa’s voting system is a PR list system,
allowing for the party to include more women on these lists for each political party
(Bauer & Britton 2006). In direct contrast, Tanzania operates in a majoritarian electoral
system, which some regard as the unfriendly “opposite” of the PR list system.
Table 5: Institutional and Cultural Differences
Tanzania

Senegal

Botswana

Lesotho

Benin

S. Africa

Latest Constitution

1977

2001

1966

1993

1990

1997

Voting System

Majority

Mixed

Majority

Mixed

Proportional

Proportional

Quotas

Reserved

LCQ

VPPQ

LCQ

none

VPPQ

Muslim

Christian

Christian

Catholic

Christian

Seats
Majority Religious

Muslim &

Beliefs

Indigenous
beliefs

Percent Economy

Ag - 31.5%

Ag - 15.8%

Ag - 2.4%

Ag - 5.4%

Ag - 23.5%

Ag - 2.5%

by sector

Ind - 25%

Ind - 23.5%

Ind - 39.2%

Ind - 31.9%

Ind - 23.2%

Ind - 29.5%

S - 43.5%

S - 60.7%

S - 58.4%

S - 68.1%

S - 53.4%

S - 68%

Fertility Rates

5.2

4.9

2.6

3.0

4.8

2.4

IPU Percent

36%

42.7%

935%

25%

7.2%

41.9%

Composite Score

4.25

5

5.25

5.25

6.5

7.5

As Tanzania votes within a majoritarian system, it is not always proportionate to
the way citizens cast their votes. Elections in this system are typically more localized
than PR elections, meaning they have smaller constituencies as well (Electoral Reform
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Society 2010). With this kind of voting system, typically there is either a single party
running for office or a two-party group. This limited number of parties does not allow for
the full range of potential female candidates, as the PR system does. The number of
women elected into office is directly related to the voting system within a given, and
getting women into elected office is half of the battle of implementing woman-friendly
policy. A woman-friendly voting system, like the PR list system, makes it easier for
women to gain access into parliaments. Tanzania’s majoritarian system could account for
the drastically low woman-friendly policy score.
Going hand-in-hand with voting system, the types of quotas, if any, can be
another significant factor for determining woman-friendly policies. Once again, Tanzania
and South Africa appear to be on the opposite ends of the spectrum. South Africa has a
voluntary political party quota in place. This ensures that some kind of percentage of
women is given seats – these quotas are different than legislated quotas in the sense that
political parties voluntarily adopt these quotas. In South Africa, paired with a PR voting
system, these kinds of quotas govern where each candidate is positioned on the list.
Voluntary quotas usually have women making up anywhere between 25 to 50 percent of
the list (Krook 2009). South Africa’s majority party, the African National Congress
(ANC) is the only political party in the country with a quota provision in place – 50
percent of the seats won in any election, local or national, must go to women legislators
(Quota Project 2015). Because the ANC has voluntarily established these quota
provisions, it shows that the party wants more women involved. When a party and a
system is friendly to women, it is likely that more will be done for women’s interests as a
whole.
Tanzania does have a kind of quota in place called reserved seats. These seats are
guaranteed to go to women; they are different than a legislated or voluntary party in the
fact that while 50 percent of the seats won will go to women, with reserved seats a
predetermined number of seats in parliament will go to women no matter what (Quota
Project 2015). While this method is great for ensuring that more women are involved in
parliament, it does run the risk of becoming purely symbolic, leading to the problem of
tokenism (Krook 2009; Conner 2008; Tripp & Kang 2008). This is what may be
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happening in Tanzania; women are being represented at a higher rate, but they have little
to show for it in terms of woman-friendly policy in the country.
Cultural factors also play a huge role in determining the reach of woman-friendly
policies in a country, as Hypothesis 3 implies. These factors can range from the major
religious beliefs of a state to fertility rates. Religion is a common theme through subSaharan Africa. It is hard to say whether or not religions can be “opposite” of one
another, but again to contrast the highest scoring and lowest scoring cases, South Africa
and Tanzania, looking at each case’s major religious beliefs have shed some light on
these differences.
Hypothesis 3a regarding religion can be accepted. The major religious belief of
Tanzania is that of the Islamic faith. The Western world holds a stereotype that the
Islamic faith is one that is not favorable towards women. While in some cases this may
be true, religion is a difficult area since most religions are not “one-size-fits-all” –
meaning that one version of Islam does not necessarily apply to all parts of the Islamic
world. With Tanzania, however, another major religious belief is those indigenous
beliefs, or the beliefs of the local tribes in the country. The numerous indigenous tribes in
this country and perhaps in many of the other cases mentioned, may hold patriarchal
beliefs that prohibit women from holding positions of power. While the region of subSaharan Africa is very vast and diverse, it is nearly impossible to generalize the
experiences of one country to many different countries around the region. There are many
Islamic countries in the region, including another case in this study, Senegal. Yet
Tanzania and Senegal scored differently on the scale and have differences in the variables
as well.
Fertility rates too should be noted for their variance. Hypothesis 3b can be
accepted; lower fertility rates will amount for more woman-friendly policy. South Africa
has a much lower fertility rate than the other cases in the study. Tanzania has the highest
fertility rate of the cases and scored the worst on the composite measure of the dependent
variable. When a society favors more children per woman, it seems to lack policy in
place to help these women and their families. Overall, Hypothesis 3 and 3b could be
accepted based on the research. Hypothesis 3a could be partially accepted, with the
exception of Benin.
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CONCLUSION
“Representation is a necessary condition for policy effectiveness, but it is not a
sufficient condition by any means” (Hassim 2006). This quote from the book Women in
African Parliaments rings true in the case of this study. While no relationship was found
connecting women’s descriptive representation and substantive representation of womanfriendly policy, there are other instances worth exploring. Strong correlations involving
voting systems and quotas imply that these systems are influential on the kinds of policy
made regarding women. Institutional and cultural circumstances should be explored in all
cases, and perhaps throughout the region to find connections and correlations. However,
as sub-Saharan Africa is such a diverse region itself, this may prove difficult as each
country may vary. Another possible factor to consider is adherence to implicit tribal laws:
are there tribal laws being followed, exempted from governing bodies? Could other
factors besides those cultural and institutional ones mentioned be playing into a surplus
or lack of policy?
An in-depth case study examining both Tanzania and South Africa should be
strived for in future studies. Cultural and institutional factors should be examined closely.
While women in parliaments is an important way to include more woman-friendly policy,
it is not the only factor involved in the process of including more legislation regarding
women.
Inglehart and Norris remark, “Moving further toward achieving equality for
women… remains one of the most important challenges facing governments in the
twenty-first century.” This is especially true in sub-Saharan Africa. When women are
equal in terms of the law, a country can greatly benefit. Marginalizing and excluding
women from policies and politics can have disastrous consequences for a country’s
progress.
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